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MEEK V. MONTANA EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT:
DETERMINING THE REASONABLE VALUE OF MEDICAL
EXPENSES IN MONTANA
Carrie Gibadlo
No: OP 14-0786
Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, March 11, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sharon Meek, Plaintiff, Petitioner and Personal Representative
of the Estate of Judy J. Meek, Deceased, (Petitioner) applied for a writ of
supervisory control to review an Order by Judge Jon A. Oldenburg of the
Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. The Order
prohibited the Petitioner from presenting the original charges of Judy M.
Meek’s (Judy) medical expenses and limited the reasonable value of
medical care, and consequently recoverable damages, to the amounts
paid by Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BCBS). Petitioner
presents the following challenges on review:1 (1) the tortfeasor is
responsible for the reasonable value of a tort victim’s injuries charged at
the time of service regardless of the amount actually paid; and (2) the
Order violated Montana’s collateral source statute as well as the common
law collateral source rule.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On November 3, 2011 Judy fell on the business premises of
Bennett Motor, Inc. (Defendant Bennett Motors) and Pierce Dodge City,
Inc. (Defendant Pierce) (collectively Defendants). After receiving
medical treatment for the injuries, Judy was billed $197,154.93.
However, the medical providers accepted $70,711.26 to fully satisfy the
bill from Judy’s insurers—Medicare and BCBS. The discounted amount
1

This article will not discuss all of the Petitioner’s other claims including: (1) the matter is urgent
and the normal appeal process is inadequate; (2) the issues raised on review are purely legal; and (3)
constitutional issue of state-wide importance are involved.
2
The facts presented in this section are drawn from two documents: (1) Pet. For Writ of Supervisory
Control, Meek v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct., http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/
search/getDocument?documentid=99042 (Mont. Dec. 9, 2014) (No: OP 14-0786) (hereinafter Pet.
For Writ); and (2) Response to Pet. For Writ of Supervisory Control, Meek v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist.
Ct., http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=101197 (Mont. Jan. 14,
2015) (No. OP 14-0786) (hereinafter Response to Pet.).
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reflected the federally mandated rates for Medicare and pre-negotiated
rates pursuant to BCBS’s Preferred Provider Agreement (PPA).
On August 27, 2012, Petitioner filed a wrongful death suit in the
Eight Judicial District Court against the Defendants seeking survival and
wrongful death damages on behalf of Judy’s husband and two sons. On
April 10, 2014, Defendant Pierce filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and a Motion in Limine to prevent Petitioner from presenting
evidence of the amount originally billed to Judy and limit the evidence
and recovery of damages to the amount actually paid. Shortly thereafter,
Defendant Bennett Motors joined the motion. Petitioner filed an Answer
Brief supported by supplemental authority, and the Defendants filed
Responses. On August 11, 2014, the parties presented oral arguments on
the matter to Judge Oldenburg who shortly thereafter granted both of the
motions in favor of the Defendants. If unchanged, the Order will prevent
Petitioner from presenting evidence of the amounts originally billed and
will restrict damages to the amount actually paid by Judy’s insurers. This
case is scheduled to begin trial in the District Court on April 13, 2015.
The Petitioner sought and was granted review of the Order by the
Montana Supreme Court. This is a case of first impression for the Court.
III. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’ BRIEFS AND SUPPORTING
AMICUS BRIEFS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments on Review
According to Montana Pattern Jury Instructions, a tortfeasor is
liable for “the reasonable value of necessary care, treatment and services
received” and “any reasonable medical charges which were incurred in
connection with the death.”3 The reasonable value of care is the amount
incurred at the time of service because “a common sense understanding
dictates. . . [that the injured party] is responsible for the charges from that
moment forward.”4 When an insurer pays medical expenses the victim is
simply relieved of previously assumed liability.5 Therefore, a tortfeasor
is liable for the total cost of medical expenses incurred regardless of the
amount later paid.6
Montana’s collateral source statute, like the majority of
jurisdictions, prohibits juries from considering collateral benefits when
determining an award for reasonable medical expenses.7 Under Mont.
Code Ann. § 27–1–308, a judge can reduce damages after a jury award if
the plaintiff has or will receive compensation from a collateral source
3

Pet. for Writ, supra n. 2, at 4–5.
Id. at 6 (quoting Winter v. State Farm, 351 P.3d 665, 670 (Mont. 2014).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 6.
7
Id. at 5–7.
4
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without subrogation rights.8 Shielding the jury from the collateral sources
prevents prejudice when determining damages and ensures that the
victim and tortfeasor are treated fairly.9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) explains that
under the collateral source rule “[p]ayments made to or benefits
conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against
the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for
which the tortfeasor is liable.”10 In the majority of U.S. jurisdictions,
write-offs and write-downs—the reduction of medical expenses based on
lower rates—are collateral benefits. As such, a jury should determine a
tortfeasor’s liability according to the reasonable value of care—not an
amount reduced because of a write-off or write-down.11
Montana Trial Lawyers Association supported the Petitioner’s
claim in an amicus brief and emphasized that under Mont. Code Ann. §
27–1–307(1) collateral source benefits include payments of medical
expenses available to the plaintiff from public programs and private
health insurance.12 Furthermore, the legislature’s intent and Montana’s
statutory language prohibit the admission of collateral source benefits
until after trial.13 The Court as well as courts in other states with similar
collateral source statutes, like Oregon and Minnesota, have affirmed that
assistance in medical payments from insurers is inadmissible because of
the prejudicial impact to the tort victim.14
Judy incurred $197,154.93 in liability when she was billed by
her medical providers because she accepted the terms of service.15 When
her insurers paid a lower amount later they relieved her of that liability.16
The lower amount paid by her insurers is a collateral benefit, and not
credited to the Defendants under Montana’s collateral source state.17 As
such, Judy’s reasonable value of medical care is $197,154.93.18 Judge
Oldenburg’s Order contradicts the Court’s decision in Winter v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. because the Order finds that Judy did
not incur liability at the time of service.19 Contrary to the collateral
source rule, the Order allows the tortfeasor to be credited for the reduced
amount of medical expenses.20 If the jury considers the reduced amount,
8

Id. at 7 (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 27–1–308(1) (2013)).
Pet. for Writ, supra n. 2, at 9.
10
Id. at 5 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (2)).
11
Id. at 5–6.
12
Amicus Curiae Br. of the Mont. Tr. Laws. Assn., Meek v. Mont. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct.,
http://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/search/getDocument?documentid=101646 at 4–5 (Mont. Jan. 20,
2015) (No. OP-14-0786).
13
Id. at 7.
14
Id. at 6–8.
15
Pet. for Writ, supra n. 2 at 6.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 4–6.
19
Id. at 6.
20
Id.
9
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instead of the full charges, the Petitoner will suffer a gross injustice
because her special and general damages will be lower.21 Furthermore, a
settlement is unlikely if the claim is reduced.22
B. Defendants’ Argument on Review
Compensatory damages make a plaintiff as whole as possible by
redressing concrete loss.23 However, compensatory damages are not
intended to be profitable—they are intended to make the plaintiff
whole.24 When determining the reasonable value of medical care for
compensatory damages, numerous courts, including the California
Supreme Court, have found that the amounts initially charged by
providers are insincere—bills are rarely paid in full, and the inflated rates
are often arbitrary.25 Therefore, reasonable value of medical care is best
determined by the amount actually paid which prevents the plaintiff from
receiving a profit and a windfall.26
Analogous to Meek is the Court’s decision in Newbury v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Ins.27 In Newbury, the Court held that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recovery because all of his expenses had already been
paid by workers’ compensation.28 The Court expanded on the Newbury
holding in Harris v. St. Vincent Healthcare.29 The plaintiff in Harris was
not allowed to recover from the medical provider because the provider
did not breach any contracts and the victim’s expenses had been fully
paid.30 In both cases, the Court denied damages because they would be
profitable and result in a windfall for the plaintiff.31 Although the Court
allowed the plaintiff to recover damages in Winter, the facts of the case
were distinct from Meek.32 In Winter, the insurer defendant denied a
claim based on the term ‘incur’ as it was used in an insurance contract
which allowed for double recovery.33 Because the claim was a contracts
claim, not a torts claim, the Court allowed for double recovery.34 In dicta
the Winter Court opined that tort claims, like the claim in Meek, are
subject to different restrictions for damages in order to prevent a windfall
for the plaintiff.35
21

Pet. for Writ, supra n. 2, at 9.
Id.
23
Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 3.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 5–6.
26
Id. at 4.
27
184 P.3d 1021 (Mont. 2006).
28
Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 12.
29
305 P.3d 852 (Mont. 2013).
30
Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 11–12.
31
Id. at 12.
32
Id. at 10–11.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
22
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Pre-negotiated terms are not a collateral source benefits and
should be admitted into evidence.36 Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-307 defines
a collateral source as “a payment for something that is later included in a
tort award and that is made to or for the benefit of a plaintiff or is
otherwise available to the plaintiff for medical expenses.”37 However, the
difference in the amount billed and the amount paid is: (1) not a
payment, (2) not otherwise recoverable, and (3) not a benefit provided
for the plaintiff to compensate for his or her injuries.38 According to
common law, “a discounted price is not a payment…Nor has the value of
damages the plaintiff avoided ever been the measure of tort recovery.”39
Therefore, any recovery resulting from the difference in the prenegotiated medical expenses and the billed amount are damages the
plaintiff would recover in the first instance from the tortfeasor.40
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court, after interpreting a statute
similar to Montana’s collateral source statute, found that reduced medical
costs are not a benefit to the plaintiff to compensate for their injuries.41
The cost reduction is a strategic business decision between the insurers
and providers for their own benefit.42 Because the difference in cost is
not a payment, otherwise collectible, or a benefit, it is not subject to
Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–308 nor the common law collateral source
rule.43
IV. ANALYSIS
The Meek Court’s holding will significantly impact Montana
litigation because the amount plaintiffs can recover for medical expenses
may be substantially limited by the ruling. The most important issues in
this case include: (1) did Judy incur liability at the time of service; (2)
what is the reasonable value of medical care; and (3) does the collateral
source rule limit evidence of and damages for the differences in the
amount of medical expenses charged compared to the Medicare and
BCBS rates.
To determine if Judy incurred liability the Court must first define
“incur” in the context of this case. In Montana, the most persuasive
authority the Court can consider seems to be Justice Rice’s opinion in
Winter. Although the Respondents correctly distinguish that Meek is a
torts claim while Winter presented a contracts claim, several U.S.
jurisdictions have found that the “common sense” definition of incur
36

Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 6–7.
Mont Code Ann. § 27–1–307.
Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 5–7.
39
Id. at 8 (citing Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, 257 P.3d 1130, 1143–1144 (Cal. 2011)).
40
Id. at 8.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 6–9.
37
38
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applies to both types of cases.44 Although Justice Rice wrote in dicta that
damages must be different in torts and contracts cases, the definition of
incur does not necessarily determine the amount of permissible damages.
If the Court finds that Judy incurred liability of the amount billed
she is not guaranteed damages for that amount. Under Montana law, the
Court would still need to determine if the amount billed is reasonable.
The Respondent presents a compelling argument that the amount billed is
arbitrarily determined and the amount actually paid is the reasonable
value. The Respondent’s argument is supported by both the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and the California Supreme Court.45 Furthermore, the
Court has consistently ruled that if a plaintiff has been relieved of all
liability they are not entitled to additional recovery which supports the
Respondent’s claim that compensatory damages should not be
profitable.46 The Court could find that Judy incurred liability at the time
of services, but the amount charged would allow the jury to impose
unreasonable damages. If the Court rules this way, the collateral source
rule would necessarily need to apply so the judge can limit damages after
the jury award.
The collateral source rule will only limit damages if the
difference in the amount billed and the pre-negotiated terms constitute a
payment, a benefit, and would otherwise be recoverable by the
plaintiff—all three qualifications must be met. Again, these qualification
are dependent on whether or not Judy incurred liability. For example, if
she incurred liability at the time of service the tortfeasor would be liable
for the full amount (even if the amount is unreasonable) so the amount
would be “otherwise recoverable.”
Lastly, Judge Oldenburg’s Order prohibited the Petitioner from
presenting evidence of the amounts billed by Judy’s medical providers—
an evidentiary exclusion other courts have either denied47 or chosen not
to comment on.48 The limitation seems unprecedented and can only be
upheld if Judy did not incur liability at the time of services. If she did
incur liability, then presumably the amount is recoverable even if it must
be later reduced by the judge to be reasonable.
Because the application of the collateral source rule in this case
depends on the definition of incur, it is important that the Court ask and
answer this question clearly. Any ambiguities could lead to future
discrepancies in Montana district courts’ interpretation of the holding.

44
See Worsham v. Greenfield, 78 A.3d 358 (Md. 2013); W. Va. v. McGraw, 760 S.E.2d 590 (W. Va.
2014).
45
See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138.
46
Response to Pet., supra n. 2, at 11–13.
47
Chapman v. Mazda Motor of Am., 7 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1125 (Mont. 1998).
48
Howell, 257 P.3d at 1146.

